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PRESIDENTS AND MUMMIES AND PATENTS, OH MY:
WHY PATENTING SPECIAL EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY
IS LIKE A BOX OF CHOCOLATES, YOU NEVER
KNOW WHAT YOU'RE GOING TO GET
J.D. ROBERTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1994, when most moviegoers came out of
Forrest Gump delighted, Richard Bloomstein came out dismayed.'
When Forrest Gump interacted with real-life people like John F.
Kennedy and John Lennon, their lip movements were altered so
that they spoke dialogue that fit in with the story of the film and not
what they had originally said. This was done by a special effect
"technique" similar to one for which Bloomstein held two patents.
Later, while watching the program "Movie Magic," which explained
how the effects were done, Bloomstein said, "I was seeing . . .a
demonstration of everything in [my own patent] on television."2
Bloomstein filed suit for patent infringement against Paramount
Pictures, the studio that produced Forrest Gump.3
It seemed like a simple enough case. Bloomstein already held
the patents. 4 He had taken the inventive step of noticing a problem
to be solved and developing a process to overcome it. A computer-
generated special effect if done properly can be seamless, so much
so that audience members do not realize that they are watching a
special effect.5 Complex computer technology lies behind that
seamless end. Because of the complexity of what is required to pro-
duce a computer-generated special effect, this simple dispute re-
quires an analysis of almost every area of patent law before arriving
* Student-at-Law, Merchant Law Group, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada. Uni-
versity of Saskatchewan, B.A.; University of Saskatchewan, LL.B.
1. Michael Martinez, Inventor Says Something's Wrong with 'Gump' Picture, CHI.
TJB., Mar. 23, 1995, at 1.
2. Id.
3. Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998). Bloomstein alleged that Para-
mount and Lucas Digital Ltd. used special effect "morphing" techniques that in-
fringed on his patents. See id.
4. See id. Bloomstein had been issued U.S. Patent No. 4,600,281 and U.S. Pat-
ent No. 4,827,532. See id.
5. See Bloomstein, 1998 LEXIS 20839, at *5 ([Tlhe fictional title character ap-
pears to be conversing with actual images of former presidentsJohn Kennedy, Lyn-
don Johnson, and Richard Nixon as well as with musician John Lennon.").
(237)
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at a solution. The definitions of process, manufacture and compo-
sition of matter, the patentability of computer software, the printed
matter doctrine, the history of patenting film and film related mat-
ters, and even the patenting of life all play a role in determining
whether special effects technologies deserve protection.
There are two issues to be addressed regarding patenting spe-
cial effects. The first is whether a patent is obtainable for a process
of producing special effects. The second is whether a patent can be
obtained in the resulting film. This Article will examine the case
law in the United States, where the majority of special effects origi-
nate, and Canada, where an increasing number of American films
are being produced. The analysis concludes that processes involv-
ing computer technology are patentable both in the U.S. and Ca-
nada, but patent claims in the resulting film itself are not likely to
be permitted under the current law. The Article will then examine
the history of patenting films and the increasing liberalization of
patent requirements in the area of patenting of life, and it con-
cludes that the bar on patenting films is based on misunderstand-
ings and outdated law. For the purposes of this analysis, the two
Bloomstein patents will be used to show just why they are or are not
patentable.
II. THE BLOOMSTEIN PATENT AND THE COURTS
A. The Claims
Bloomstein obtained two patents for his system: U.S. Patent
No. 4,600,281 (hereinafter the '281 patent) and U.S. Patent No.
4,827,532 (hereinafter the '532 patent). The litigation surrounding
the '532 patent is the only time that the patentability of a cinematic
work has ever come before the courts. As Judge Patel of the District
Court of the Northern District of California noted in herjudgment,
both of these patents are essentially the same. For purposes that
will become apparent later, it is important to explain what Bloom-
stein's two patents claim and how they differ.
Regarding Bloomstein's first patent, Claim 1 of the '281 pat-
ent, which is representative of the entire patent, claims a patent in a
method of altering a cinematic work by substituting a second
animated facial display for a first display. Both displays exhibit lip
movements that are sufficiently different to constitute different lan-
guages. This method consists of three parts. The first involves gen-
erating data in digital form that represents the second facial display
over different cinematic frames. The second is the same method of
[Vol. 7: p. 237
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digital data for the first facial display. The third involves using both
sets of data in a "programmed digital computer" so that the first
facial display can be altered into the second.
Regarding Bloomstein's second patent, Claim 1 of the '532 pat-
ent claims a patent in "a cinematic work having an altered facial
display" that is made in accordance with a process that is described
using the same words as Claim 1 of the '281 patent.
B. Patentability of Special Effects as Computer Software
1. How are Special Effects Done?
Most computer-generated special effects are achieved through
animation. There are two methods of animation: key frame anima-
tion, which involves drawing the principal frames of the animation
onto the computer and then using the computer to alter them; and
performance animation, which uses live actors covered with data-
generating sensors. 6 Both of Bloomstein's patents use key frame
animation. To explore this topic more fully, one must first intro-
duce an example of performance animation.
In the movie The Mummy, 7 performance animation was used to
bring lifelike human movement to Imhotep, a mummy brought
back from the dead, during the stages in which Imhotep had not
yet acquired human form. The special effects technicians had Ar-
nold Vosloo, the actor playing the Imhotep character, wear a suit
with sensors that picked up the movements of him walking and
transformed them into data on a computer.8 At that point the com-
puter had an electronic mock-up of Vosloo's skeleton walking.9 An-
imation was then applied over that electronic skeleton to give the
effect of a walking human body that had been decomposed for
thousands of years. 10 For the purposes of this Article, this anima-
tion method will be referred to as the "Mummy patent."
6. Mikael Havluciyan, Patents Come to the Rescue of Special Effects: Why Patents are
an Essential Element in the Protection of Computer-Generated Special Effects, 18 Loy. L.A.
ENr. L.J. 101, 104 (1997). Key frame animation is produced via a five-step process,
w irhh n-rethr -ireducs animatinn time. Spo id. t 1 .4-fi. The newer performance
animation is even less expensive and faster than key frame animation. See id. at
106-07.
7. Tm MuMMY (Universal Studios 1999).
8. Building a Better Mummy, THE MUMMY (Universal Studios 1999, DVD Collec-
tor's Edition) (showing use of markers, either magnetic trackers or ping-pong balls
with reflective tape, with optical cameras).
9. See id. (revealing process of creating skeleton, muscle structure and virtual
flesh on computer and use of software to reconstruct actor's motions in three
dimensions).
10. See id. (demonstrating how graphic artists enhanced computer model,
which was replicating human motion).
2000]
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2. History of the Patentability of Computer Technology in the United
States
The issue of what is patentable subject matter is answered by 35
U.S.C. § 101:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of
this title.
The history of patenting computer technology was outlined by
Justice Stevens in Diamond v. Diehr.11 This history is useful to under-
stand the underlying reasons that computer software had been de-
nied patent protection and to compare Diehr with Canadian cases.
In 1965, concern regarding the patent system's ability to deal
with rapidly changing technology led to the formation of the Presi-
dent's Commission on the Patent System.12 The Commission rec-
ommended that computer programs be excluded from patent
protection because the Patent Office would be unable to deal with
the administrative burden of examining the flood of patent applica-
tions that would follow if computer programs were allowed protec-
tion. 13 This same concern can be seen in the three major cases in
this area, Gottschalk v. Benson,14 Parker v. Flook,15 and Diamond v.
Diehr. Justice Stevens in Diehr pointed out that
Gottschalk... Parker, and Diamond were not ordinary liti-
gants - each was serving as Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks when he opposed the availability of patent
protection for a program-related invention. No doubt
each may have been motivated by a concern about the
ability of the Patent Office to process effectively the flood
11. 450 U.S. 175, 194-205 (1981) (determining whether process for curing
rubber, which includes mathematical formula and programmed digital computer,
is patentable).
12. See id. at 197. Prior to 1968, the mental-steps doctrine would have pre-
vented patenting a computer program because a patent could not be justified
where the sole novel element or inventive contribution was a mental operation or
mathematical computation. See id. at 195. Mere functions of machines were also
considered unpatentable. See id. at 196.
13. See id. at 197. Almost concurrently, the Patent Office proposed guidelines
that would make computer programs unpatentable. See id.
14. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). For a discussion of Gottschalk, see infra notes 19-21
and accompanying text.
15. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). For a discussion of Parker, see infra notes 22-29 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 7: p. 237
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of applications that would flow from a decision that com-
puter programs are patentable.1 6
Justice Stevens also noted that the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals ("C.C.P.A.") did not share these concerns. It reversed the
Board of Appeals of the Patent and Trademark Office decisions not
to grant patents, and then it, too, was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court in each case except Diehr.17 The wavering on this
issue was criticized because the cases did "not establish rules that
enable[d] a conscientious patent lawyer to determine with a fair
degree of accuracy which, if any, program-related inventions
[would] be patentable." 18
Gottschalk v. Benson involved a method for converting numeri-
cal information from binary-coded decimal numbers into pure bi-
nary numbers for use in programming a conventional computer. 19
The Patent Office rejected the application for its patent, but the
C.C.P.A. upheld it as patentable subject matter.20 The United
States Supreme Court, in an unanimous decision, reversed the
C.C.P.A.; the Court found that the method was not a "process" be-
cause it amounted to an attempt to patent nothing more than an
abstract idea.2 '
In Parker v. Flook, the differences in opinion that existed be-
tween the Patent Office and the C.C.P.A. also began to divide the
Supreme Court. Three justices, namely Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, took the C.C.P.A.'s position while
four justices, namely Justices Stevens, Blackmun, Brennan and Mar-
shall, agreed with the Patent Office's position. Justices White and
Powell represented the swing votes. The invention in Parker was a
method for updating alarm limits during catalytic conversion
processes, but its only novel feature was a mathematical formula.22
Again the Patent Office determined that this invention was not pat-
entable. The C.C.P.A. found that it was patentable, but the majority
16. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 218. For a discussion of the President's Commission on
the Patent System, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
17. See id. (noting that Court of Customs and Patent Appeals changed its posi-
tion in 1968).
18. Id. at 219. Justice Stevens found that this criticism would be most ad-
versely affected by the majority's decision. See id.
19. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 64 (1972). The claims were broad
and included use of the method in any type of general purpose digital computer.
See id.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 71-73 (stating that practical effect of patent would be patent on
idea of algorithm itself).
22. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978).
20001
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of the Court held it was not.23 The issue in Parker was whether a
claimed process loses its status as "patentable subject matter" if one
step considered in isolation would not be patentable subject mat-
ter.24 Justice Stevens for the majority held that because the steps in
the process were already known, the invention was not patentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.25 Justice Stewart, in a strong
dissent in which the then Chief Justice Burger and current Chief
Justice Rehnquist concurred, agreed with the C.C.P.A.26 The Court
determined that Benson did not apply to this case because the solu-
tion of the algorithm would not amount to an infringement. 27 Jus-
tice Stewart answered the question at issue by saying that thousands
of patented processes contained one or more steps that would have
been patentable subject matter on their own. 28 He further stated
that the majority "[struck] what seems ... to be an equally damag-
ing blow [as turning its back on the precedents that say it does not
offend § 101 to have a patent in a process that includes one unpat-
entable step] at the basic principles of patent law by importing into
its inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty and inven-
tiveness. Section 101 is concerned only with subject-matter
patentability. "29
Diamond v. Diehr involved a process for curing synthetic rubber
that used a mathematical formula and a programmed digital com-
puter. Justice Rehnquist, writing the opinion, held that this was
patentable subject matter under § 101, and it was irrelevant that a
mathematical equation was used because no attempt was made to
preempt others from using that equation; the only prohibition was
in using the equation in conjunction with the other steps in the
process.30 Further, the use of a computer did not render the pro-
cess unpatentable because the computer was used to achieve a re-
sult previously unknown in the art.3 1 In dissent, Justice Stevens
23. See id. at 587-88 (identifying how courts differed in their interpretations of
Gottschalk holding).
24. See id. at 585 (considering whether applications of formula are patent-
able).
25. See id. at 594-95.
26. See id. at 599-600 (explaining Gottschalk's inapplicability).
27. See Parker, 437 U.S. at 599.
28. See id. at 599-600 (citing Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261
U.S. 45 (1923) and Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1800)).
29. Id. at 600 (limiting holding to subject-matter patentability).
30. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (clarifying that patent only
seeks to prevent others from using mathematical formula in conjunction with all of
other steps in process).
31. Id. (explaining that precedent does not dictate that any patent including
computer program will be held invalid).
[Vol. 7: p. 237
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stated that a computer program-related invention is unpatentable
unless it makes a contribution to the art that is not dependent en-
tirely on the use of a computer.32
The next significant case after Diehr is In Re Warmerdam.33 In
rejecting the inventor's claim, Judge Plager rejected the old test
that a computer program is unpatentable if it is no more than a
mathematical algorithm:
The difficulty is that there is no clear agreement as to what
is a "mathematical algorithm," which makes rather dicey
the determination of whether the claim as a whole is no
more than that .... An alternative to creating these arbi-
trary definitional terms ... may lie simply in returning to
the language of the statute and the Supreme Court's basic
principles .... 34
Thus, the standard under § 101 became less and less strict. In
In Re Beauregard,35 the Patent Appeal Board initially rejected Beau-
regard's computer program product claims on the basis of the
printed matter doctrine. During the appeals process, the Commis-
sioner and the Board withdrew their oppositions stating that, "com-
puter programs embodied in a tangible medium, such as floppy
diskettes, are patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101."
The Commissioner also agreed that the printed matter doctrine was
not applicable. This effectively overturned the majority opinions in
Benson and Flook.
While Warmerdam held that the mathematical algorithm test
was no longer the way to decide this issue, the Federal Circuit Court
of Appeals went further in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group Inc.,3 6 which appears to hold that mathematical al-
gorithms are patentable subject matter under § 101. 3 7 The inven-
tion involved in State Street was a data processing system that
32. Id. at 219-20 (contending that computer must accomplish more than
merely what was being done before).
33. 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (considering whethei ijethod and appar-
tus for controlling motions of objects and machines to avoid collision had requisite
statutory subject matter).
34. Id. at 1359 (explaining shortcoming of Freeman-Walter-Abele test, which
first determines whether mathematical algorithm is recited directly or indirectly,
and then determines whether invention is merely algorithm).
35. 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the printed matter
doctrine, see infra notes 13145 and accompanying text.
36. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
37. See id. at 1373 (clarifying that to be patentable, algorithms must be ap-
plied in useful way); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
20001
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recorded a financial information flow and made calculations neces-
sary for maintaining a partner services fund.38 It allowed several
mutual funds to pool their investments into a single portfolio,
which consolidated the costs of administering the funds combined
with the flow-through taxation advantages of partnership.39 Judge
Rich held that an algorithm is patentable subject matter if it is ap-
plied in a useful way.40 Unlike the other cases in this area, State
Street did not involve a patent application that was denied. Rather,
the matter came to court because State Street Bank was negotiating
with the patent holder for a license; it was only when negotiations
broke down that State Street Bank claimed the patent was invalid.41
The fact that State Street Bank wanted to use this method was clear
evidence that it was commercially useful, and this appears to have
influenced greatly Judge Rich's judgment that, "the essential char-
acteristics of the subject matter [are], in particular, its practical util-
ity .... This renders it statutory subject matter even if the useful
result is expressed in numbers .... ",42 The result may have been
different had this been an appeal from a decision by the Patent
Appeal Board and had there been no clear evidence of utility. Nev-
ertheless, it represents clear recognition by the courts that com-
puter-related patents have come a long way and are, in most cases,
now clearly statutory subject matter under § 101.
3. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions
In 1996, the United States Patent and Trademark Office pub-
lished the Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions,43
which outlines the steps that Office personnel should follow when
considering an application for a computer-related patent.44 The
38. See State Street, 149 F.3d at 1371 (noting that system was developed for
Signature's business).
39. Id. (explaining that system determines daily changes quickly and accu-
rately, and this is essential to meeting business demands).
40. See id. at 1373. Judge Rich explained that for an algorithm to be applied
in a useful way meant either that the result would produce a useful, concrete and
tangible result or the result would correspond to a useful, concrete or tangible
thing. See id.
41. See id. at 1370 (relating that State Street was negotiating for license to use
patented system, and then filed action asserting patent's invalidity).
42. See id. at 1375 (rejecting business method exception and finding that sys-
tem was patentable subject matter). Under the business method exception, pat-
ents that relate to doing business are denied. See id.
43. Examination Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg.
7478 (Feb. 16, 1996) [hereinafter Guidelines].
44. See id. at 7478-479 (explaining that Guidelines assist examiners in analyzing
subject matter for compliance with substantive law).
[Vol. 7: p. 237
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Guidelines state that they "are based on the Office's current under-
standing of the law and are believed to be fully consistent with bind-
ing precedent of the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit and the
Federal Circuit's predecessor courts[, but the Guidelines] do not
have the force and effect of law."' 45 In Bloomstein v. Paramount Pic-
tures Corp.,46 Judge Patel recognized that they had no force of law,
but he nonetheless found "them instructive on this issue." There-
fore, following the procedure set out in the Guidelines likely gives a
good indication of the patentability of special effects technology be-
cause the Office is the first hurdle an invention must get over to
obtain a patent.47
The first step under the Guidelines is to determine what "the
applicant has invented and is seeking to patent, and how the claims
relate to and define that invention." 48 Under this step, the Guide-
lines adopt the Warmerdam/Diehr approach and look at the claim as a
whole to identify whether the invention has any "real world
value."49 Both the '281 patent and the Mummy patent would pass
this requirement. Bloomstein believed that subtitles in foreign
films were distracting, and he invented this process so that a film in
another language could be dubbed into English and the foreign
actors' lips would move as if English were being spoken.50 This in-
vention would have a use in the real world. The Mummy patent is
also useful. Without it, it would be impossible to have an animation
that would replicate human movement. Instead, the filmmakers
would have to use a person dressed up in bandages as they did in
45. See id. at 7479 (clarifying that Guidelines are not law, but merely assist Pat-
ent and Trademark Office personnel in analyzing patent applications).
46. No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *22 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
10, 1998) (using Guidelines to distinguish between functional and non-functional
descriptive material).
47. Because this Article is concerned with the issue of the patentability of spe-
cial effects technology in general, the steps in the Guidelines regarding prior art
and disclosure requirements will not be discussed because, for the purposes of this
Article, it is assumed that these patents are the first of their kind.
48. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7479 (explaining that review of complete appli-
cation will be performed, rather than simply initial determination of whether it
simply recites mathematical algorithm).
49. Id. at 7479-480 (specifically rejecting claims for inventions which are
merely idea or concept or which are starting point for further research). "An in-
vention that has a practical application in the technological arts satisfies the utility
requirement." Id. at 7479. In determining what has been invented, the Patent and
Trademark Office will rely heavily on the information the inventor provides; there-
fore the Guidelines should be consulted prior to filing the application. See id. at
7480.
50. Martinez, supra note 1, at 5.
2452000]
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the older mummy movies that were made before computer-related
technologies were used. 51
The Office then reviews the claims. The Guidelines state, "Of-
fice personnel must rely on the applicant's disclosure to properly
determine the meaning of terms used in the claims. An applicant is
entitled to be his or her own lexicographer .... "52 The practical
significance of this passage is illustrated by what happened to the
'281 patent. Because Bloomstein never anticipated that his inven-
tion would be used to change lip movements from English into En-
glish, the court found that there was no infringement. Havluciyan,
the only other commentator on this issue, writing before this came
to trial, stated that the '281 patent was "an excellent illustration of
the scope of [a patent] dealing with computer animation. Bloom-
stein's patent would be stronger... if it was not limited to changing
facial expressions to fit the words of a different language."53 The
lesson here is that while the law may allow special effects technology
to be patented, the drafting of the claim is still very important. The
Guidelines will hold the applicant to what is written in the claim. If
the invention is not defined properly, infringement will not be able
to be stopped. Havluciyan suggests, "Bloomstein might have
drafted a claim that read: 'a method of altering facial displays utiliz-
ing electronic technology.' Such a claim... illustrates the potential
magnitude a patent can provide."54
The patent must comply with 35 U.S.C. § 101. The Guidelines
were formulated around the time of Warmerdam, so their interpreta-
tion of the text of § 101 relates that to get a patent, the inventor
must have a machine, manufacture, composition of material, or a
process.5 5 In line with this limitation, the Guidelines state that the
claimed invention must be classified into one or more statutory or
51. See Building a Better Mummy, THE MUMMY (Universal Studios 1999, DVD
Collector's Edition) (explaining how computer generation was used specifically to
avoid actors being wrapped in bandages).
52. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7480 (any definition provided will be applied
throughout application, but in absence of specific definition, common meaning of
term will apply).
53. Havluciyan, supra note 6, at 113 (explaining that Bloomstein's patent spe-
cifically stated that it applied to making changes in mouth and facial expressions to
accommodate different languages).
54. Id. (explaining advantage of process patents is that if patent is broad,
processes may still infringe even if they use other kinds of machines or subsequent
technology).
55. See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481 (outlining categories created by 35
U.S.C. § 101).
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non-statutory categories.5 6 There are two statutory categories in
which an invention could fall: it could be either a statutory product
claim or a statutory process claim.
The Guidelines define a product claim as, "a claim defin [ing] a
useful machine or manufacture by identifying the physical structure
of the machine or manufacture in terms of its hardware or hard-
ware and software combination."57 Bloomstein's '281 patent clearly
does not fall within this definition, however the Mummy patent
might. Because the Mummy patent involves the sensors that were
placed on the actor's body to capture the movements and send
them back to the computer, these sensors amount to a useful ma-
chine.58 However, the Guidelines break down product claims into
two categories. The first is for a claim that encompasses machines
that cause a computer to perform an underlying process, and the
second is for a claim that defines a specific machine or manufac-
ture.59 The inventor in the Mummy situation might be entitled to
the second type of a product patent because of the invention of the
sensors. However, the Guidelines state that a claim will fall into the
first category if it defines the physical characteristics of a computer
component (like the sensor) exclusively as functions to be per-
formed by the computer and that encompasses every product con-
figured in a way to perform that process. 60 If this turns out to be
the case, then the claim must be examined on whether the process
is statutory, and the claim would not be a product claim at all.61
This is not a negative thing; in fact, it provides greater protection
than a product claim would. To illustrate this point, Havluciyan
gave an example similar to the Mummy patent of a dancer wearing a
data suit with motion sensors that make an animated figure inside a
computer move as he or she moves and concluded that a process
patent "can protect the entire process ... including the data suits,
56. Id. (clarifying that classification in either category is simply initial finding,
which will be further examined for statutory compliance); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103. 112 (1984).
57. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7482 (defining statutory process claims and giv-
ing examples).
58. See Building a Better Mummy, THE MUMMY (Universal Studios 1999, DVD
Collector's Edition) (demonstrating how markers on actor were utilized).
59. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7482 (explaining that claims in second category
are statutory, while claims in first category require analysis of underlying process).
60. See id. (explaining that existence of hardware element does not automati-
cally place claim in second category).
61. See id. at 7482-483 (explaining how classification of underlying process will
affect classification of product claim).
2000] 247
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other hardware, and software." 62 Therefore in the above example,
the inventor could patent the motion sensors as a product patent,
or the inventor could patent everything involved in the process pro-
vided that the process is statutory subject matter.
To patent the Mummy and Bloomstein patents as process
claims, they must fall into the definition of a process claim. The
Guidelines relate that a process claim is "a claim that requires one or
more acts to be performed."63 The Mummy patent requires the ac-
tor to move while wearing the sensors, and it also requires the com-
puter to interpret that information into a moving animated
skeleton. Thus, the Mummy patent comprises more than one act to
be performed. 64 Bloomstein's '281 patent requires that the lip posi-
tions from each facial movement be calculated, and then the com-
puter must make the one match the other on the film. This brings
it within the definition of a process claim. However satisfying this
definition is only enough to satisfy § 101 prima facie; it still must be
shown that the claim is statutory. 65 The Guidelines state that "a
claimed process is clearly statutory if it results in a physical transfor-
mation [that] falls into one or both of the following ('safe
harbors')."66
The first safe harbor is an independent physical act.67 Thus, "if
a process claim includes one or more post-computer process steps
that result in a physical transformation outside the computer ...
the claim is clearly statutory."68 The Guidelines give an example of a
process that controls a robot by storing data in a computer repre-
senting the robot's mechanical movements and uses a computer to
calculate the robot's position and to move the robot based on those
calculations. 69 The '281 patent does not fall within this first safe
62. Havluciyan, supra note 6, at 119 (clarifying difference between merely pat-
enting software and patenting everything that creates computer animation as
process).
63. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7483.
64. See Building a Better Mummy, THE MUMMY (Universal Studios 1999, DVD
Collector's Edition) ("[T]ake a performer of some type and you track the various
positions of their [sic] body using a computer to basically try to correlate in three-
dimensional space where they [sic] are and where the parts of their [sic] body are
65. See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7483 (clarifying that not all processes are
statutory); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984).
66. See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7483 (requiring that physical transforma-
tions happen outside computer).
67. See id.
68. Id. (requiring process to manipulate tangible physical objects and result
in physical change in those objects).
69. See id. at 7484 (noting examples of statutory process of independent physi-
cal act, which consists of post-computer activity).
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harbor because no physical entity is changed outside of the com-
puter. There is no independent physical act involved with the '281
patent. However, the robot example and the Mummy patent are
similar in that both involve storing data in a computer that repre-
sents movements based on movements by a physical actor outside
the computer. But in the robot example, the computer manipu-
lates the outside actor whereas in the Mummy patent, the outside
actor causes the changes in the computer. Therefore the Mummy
patent would not fall within this safe harbor.
The second safe harbor is the manipulation of data represent-
ing physical objects or activities. 70 To be statutory the process re-
quires the measurements of physical activities "to be transformed
outside of the computer into computer data, where the data com-
prises signals corresponding to" physical activities outside the com-
puter and where the process causes a physical transformation to the
signals which represent physical activities. 71 It is not immediately
clear if the '281 patent falls within this safe harbor. It involves the
measurement of lip movements of one language which are physical
activities, and it transforms those inside the computer into lip
movements of another language which represents a physical activity
as well.72 The problem lies in the phrase "measurements of physi-
cal activities to be transformed outside the computer. '73 Again, it is
helpful to look at the examples provided by the Guidelines. A statu-
tory example is a "method of using a computer processor to analyze
electrical signals and data representative of human cardiac activity
... the transformation occurs when heart activity is measured and
an electronic signal is produced."74 It is conceivable that a process
similar to the '281 patent could fall within this safe harbor, but the
'281 patent involves an electronic signal that represents human lip
movements which is similar to human cardiac activity. Also, in the
'281 patent process, there is no measurement that occurs outside of
the computer.75 Both lip movements are already entered into the
computer as electronic data. Thus the '281 patent does not fall
-4thn the scond s.qfe harbor
70. See id. (noting pre-computer process activity).
71. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7484 (explaining second safe harbor).
72. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures, No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1996 WL
251918, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1996) (noting process at issue in Bloomstein's
patents).
73. See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7484 (defining second safe harbor).
74. Id. (focusing on real world value of "predicting vulnerability to ventricular
tachycardia immediately after a heart attack").
75. See Bloomstein, 1996 WL 251918, at *2 (noting how lip movement process is
instituted in film).
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The Mummy patent, on the other hand, falls within this safe
harbor.76 Another example given by the Guidelines describes a
method of using a computer to conduct seismic exploration. 77 The
transformation occurs by "converting the spherical seismic energy
waves into electrical signals which provide a geophysical representa-
tion of formations below the earth's sur-face." 78 In the Mummy pat-
ent, the transformation occurs by converting the movements made
by the actor into electronic data, which provides representations of
the movements made by the human skeleton. 79 This safe harbor
has a second requirement, namely that the process must have real
world value.80 The Mummy patent has real world value by enabling
filmmakers to present a realistic moving mummy that looks like a
real corpse that has been decomposing for thousands of years and
that moves like a real person would.8 1 Therefore, they do not have
to resort to the old bandaged mummy look of earlier low budget
films.
Although the '281 patent did not fall into either of the safe
harbors, under the Guidelines a "claim may still be statutory [despite
not falling within either safe harbor] if it is limited by the language
in the claim to a practical application in the technological arts."8 2
The Guidelines recognize that there is always a physical transforma-
tion that occurs within the computer because a computer acts on
signals and transforms them during its operation.8 3 The important
factor is what the computer does to achieve a practical application.
If the computer merely manipulates an abstract idea or performs a
mathematical algorithm, the process will not be statutory, but if the
process is limited to a practical application of the abstract idea or
mathematical algorithm in the technical arts, it will be statutory.84
The representations of lip movements in computer data form may
76. For a discussion of how the Mummy patent meets the requirements of the
second safe harbor, see infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
77. See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7484.
78. Id. (highlighting real world value of geophysical exploration below earth's
surface).
79. For a discussion of the computer generation process, see supra notes 11-16
and accompanying text.
80. See Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7484 (noting example of when "heart activ-
ity is measured and an electrical signal is produced").
81. For a discussion of the real world value of process, see supra note 49 and
accompanying text.
82. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7484 (clarifying that processes that fall within
safe harbors are clearly statutory).
83. See id. ("[S]uch activity is not determinative of whether the process is
statutory.").
84. See id. (noting difference between statutory and non-statutory processes).
[Vol. 7: p. 237
14
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol7/iss2/3
PATENTING SPECIAL EFFECTS TECHNOLOGY
be viewed as a mathematical algorithm. There is, however, a practi-
cal application in that they would make dubbing more believable,
and they enabled Forrest Gump to speak with John F. Kennedy. An
example of a statutory claim given by the Guidelines is that "for a
digital filtering process for removing noise from a digital signal
comprising the steps of calculating a mathematical algorithm to
produce a correction signal that will remove the noise."85 The '281
patent is similar to this. It removes the lip movements of the origi-
nal language and replaces them with a mathematical algorithm that
represents the lip movements of the second language.86 The end
result produces different, practical and realistic lip movements of
another language.
4. Patenting Special Effects as Computer Software in Canada
The Canadian jurisprudence on the patentability of computer
software is not as comprehensive as its American counterpart. The
Patent Appeal Board recently pointed out in Re Motorola Inc. Patent
Application No. 2,085,22887 that "[there is only one] Canadian court
decision with respect to computer-related inventions, Schlumberger
Canada Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents."8 8 Further guidance is pro-
vided by Re Application No. 096,284,89 a decision of the Patent Ap-
peal Board that set out its position on computer-related claims.
This is the closest thing Canada has to the Guidelines. The major
difference is that the Guidelines represent the state of the law in
1994 after Warmerdam, whereas Re Application No. 096,284 repre-
sents the state of the law in 1978, before the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook 9°
The invention in Re Application No. 096,284 was a method of
seismic exploration in which subsurface interfaces are generated in
the form of acoustic signals and sent into subsurface interfaces
where they are reflected back and converted into electrical sig-
nals.91 The Board held that this was not patentable subject matter.
Compared to American jurisprudence, this decision is outdated be-
85. Id. (citing examples of statutory processes).
86. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1996
WL 251918, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1996) (explaining process by which computer
algorithms are applied to "interpolate" lip positions in frames between those
where lip position has been empirically determined).
87. [1988] 86 C.P.R. 3d 71, 74.
88. [1981] 56 C.P.R. 2d 204.
89. [1981] 52 C.P.R. 2d 96.
90. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). For a discussion of Parker, see supra notes 22-29 and
accompanying text.
91. See Re Application No. 096,284, 52 C.P.R. 2d at 96.
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cause the Guidelines give as an example of patentable subject matter
a method that "convert[s] . . . seismic energy waves into electrical
signals which provide a geophysical representation of formations
below the earth's surface. ''92 Because this was the example used to
justify awarding the Mummy patent, which is the stronger of the two
claims, it appears as if it would not be patentable in Canada. But,
this is not necessarily so. The Board does state that "where a pro-
gramme [sic] is merely an incidental part of the system, it will not
be objectionable.., however [the patent must] have novel appara-
tus tied to a computer which controls the function at the end of a
computer."93 Because the motion sensors that go on the actor's
body are an apparatus, it is likely that the Mummy patent would be
allowed. This is especially true considering the change in attitudes
since 1978 that are represented by the increased reliance and the
prevalence of computers in today's society. It is also likely that who-
ever is making the assessment on patentability, be it the Patent Of-
fice, the Appeal Board, or the courts, will be greatly influenced by
the American jurisprudence. The Mummy patent should be safe in
Canada.
Bloomstein's '281 patent faces more difficulty. For the same
reasons it failed to fall within the Guidelines' safe harbors, it will fail
to fall within the Appeal Board's decision. The '281 patent would
be seen as being predicated solely on the novelty of the program,
which Re Application No. 096,284 held was not patentable subject
matter.94 More troubling about the decision was that it came down
before Parker v. Flook.95 The Board thoroughly analyzed all of the
leading American cases and was aware that the Flook decision was
forthcoming. The Board stated,
We wait with interest.., the outcome of the U.S. Supreme
Court in [Parker v. Flook]. If that Court follows what we
understand to be the rationale of their previous decision in
[Gottschalk v. Benson], the C.C.P.A. would, we believe, be
overruled."96
92. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7484 (Feb. 16, 1996).
93. See Re Application No. 096,284, 52 C.P.R. 2d at 110.
94. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1996
WL 251918, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1996). A moving image of a person speaking
the second language is recorded. See id. A digital representation of the second
language's lip positions is obtained. See id. A computer digitally calculates how to
alter the lips to portray the second language. See id.
95. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). For a discussion of Parker, see supra notes 22-29 and
accompanying text.
96. Re Application No. 096,284, 52 C.P.R. 2d at 106 (emphasis in original).
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The Board was, of course, correct about the Supreme Court, how-
ever it failed to foresee Justice Stewart's dissent, which would carry
the day in Diamond v. Diehr. Therefore while Justice Stevens' posi-
tion is no longer the law in the United States, it is the approach that
Re Application No. 096,284 adopted in Canada, and it has not yet
been overruled.
Perhaps the '281 patent will be aided by Schlumberger.97 This
case involved a process where measurements obtained in boreholes
are recorded on magnetic tapes and then transmitted into a com-
puter where they are transformed into human readable data such
as charts, graphs, tables or figures.98 This invention would likely be
patentable under the Guidelines, and it definitely would be patenta-
ble under State Street. In Schlumberger, however, Justice Pratte held it
was unpatentable. 99 It is interesting to note the similarity in the
language of Justice Pratte and Justice Stevens, considering that
Schlumberger and Diehr were decided in the same year. In Diehr, Jus-
tice Stevens began by stating that "[t] he starting point in the proper
adjudication of patent litigation is an understanding of what the
inventor claims to have discovered." 100 In Schlumberger, Justice
Pratte began his analysis by stating that "[I]n order to determine
whether the application discloses a patentable invention, it is first
necessary to determine what, according to the application, has been
discovered."10' Justice Stevens refused the patent in Diehr because
Goodyear obtained a patent on a rubber curing process in the
1800s, and the only thing new in the application at bar was a com-
puter's calculations. 10 2 Justice Pratte decided Schlumberger on the
basis that the only thing new in the application is using a computer
to calculate which was not new because those calculations were ex-
pressly of the type for which a computer was invented.103 This may
be a coincidence, but it appears as if Justice Stevens' decision in
Diehr strongly influenced Justice Pratte. Even if the similarity were a
coincidence, it is clear thatJustice Stevens' position continued to be
97. See Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v. Comm'r of Patents, [1981] 56 C.P.R. 2d
204, 205.
98. See id. (noting process at issue for exploration of oil and gas).
99. See id. at 206 (noting that appellant's contention at trial that calculations
at issue were mechanical not mental).
100. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1981) (claiming that majority
had misunderstood context of patent application).
101. Schlumberger, 56 C.P.R. 2d at 205.
102. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 205-06 (clarifying difference between discovering
improved method for doing something and using computer to carry out old
method).
103. See Schlumberger, 56 C.P.R. 2d at 205.
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the one adopted in Canada and not the Rehnquist-Stewart position
from Parker v. Rook. Under Schlumberger, the '281 patent would be
regarded as merely using a computer to do a calculation for which
computers were invented, and, therefore, the patent would be
denied.
Jumping ahead twenty years to see how the Appeal Board de-
cided a computer related in patent in Re Motorola Inc. Patent Applica-
tion No. 2,085,228, it is notable that the decision made no mention
of Re Application No. 096,284, and it mentioned Schlumberger only to
distinguish it on the facts. Re Motorola limited Schlumberger to hold-
ing only that a computer program per se is unpatentable. 10 4 The
Board in Re Motorola held that although the invention was a device
that carried out the method of solving the algorithm, the claim did
not prevent the use of the algorithm; it only prevented the use of
the algorithm in conjunction with the process, which made it pat-
entable. 10 5 This was the rationale used by Justice Rehnquist to up-
hold the patent in Diehr.10 6 Therefore, it seems as if this lays to rest
Justice Stevens' position and allows a greater degree of protection
to computer-related inventions. Because the Guidelines were heavily
influenced by Diehr and they would grant patent protection to the
'281 patent, it appears that the Motorola decision would allow the
'281 claim to be patented in Canada.
C. Cinematic Works and the Printed Matter Doctrine
Unlike the '281 patent, the '532 patent claimed the end result-
ing cinematic work. The issue of its patentability came before the
District Court of the Northern District of California twice. 10 7 Judge
Patel's first decision held that cinematic work as claimed in the '532
patent did not mean the entire motion picture, rather it meant the
portion of which that was altered by using the method from the
'281 patent.'08 The second decision held that it was not patentable
104. See Re Motorola Inc. Patent Application No. 2,085,228, [1988] 86 C.P.R.
3d 71, 74 (noting that decision in Schlumberger was irrelevant).
105. Id. at 75.
106. See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187 (explaining that combination of process and
computer is different than just computer).
107. The first time the district court examined patentability was in Bloom-
stein's Markman hearing. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-
1864 MHP, 1996 WL 251918 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1996). The second examination
occurred in the actual order. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-
95-1864 MHP, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20839 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998).
108. See Bloomstein, 1996 WL 257918, at *3 (discussing meaning of cinematic
work).
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subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.109 Judge Patel noted, "While
defendants assert that case law holds that a cinematic work is 'un-
patentable,' they cite no cases which expressly discuss the patenta-
bility of films .... Plaintiff fares no better... [and t] his court has
not located any cases either."110
Judge Patel therefore turned to the Guidelines. The test for
non-statutory subject matter is the same as for non-computer-re-
lated inventions."' A patent claim will be non-statutory if it claims
to be descriptive material. 112 There are two ways that material can
be descriptive. First, it can be functionally descriptive such as data
structures or a computer program that is only functional when en-
coded on a computer readable medium like a disk; second it can be
non-functionally descriptive, which "includes but is not limited to
music, literary works and a compilation or mere arrangement of
data." 113 Regarding functionally descriptive material, the Guidelines
note:
Office personnel should treat a claim for a computer pro-
gram, without the computer-readable medium needed to
realize the computer program's functionality, as non-statu-
tory functional descriptive material. When a computer
program is claimed in a process where the computer is
executing the computer program's instructions, Office
personnel should treat the claim as a process claim.' 1 4
The '281 patent was considered statutory material because al-
though it used a computer, the computer executed the program's
instructions. 115 In the '532 patent, the computer is still a part of
the process, but the patent claimed is in the celluloid that needs to
109. See Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *24 (holding that patent
claims describe non-functional descriptive material).
110. See id. at *19. The court noted one case on the subject, namely In Re
Leitzell, 213 F.2d 326 (C.C.P.A. 1954). The United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals, however, resolved the case without addressing the issue of whether
a cinematic work was unpatentable subject matter. For a discussion of In Re Leitzell
see infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
111. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481 (clarifying that "claims to computer-re-
lated inventions that are clearly non-statutory fall into the same general categories
as non-statutory claims in other parts").
112. Id. (noting general categories of non-statutory subject matter as natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas or laws of nature which constitute "descriptive
material").
113. Id. (outlining types of descriptive materials).
114. Id. at 7482 (clarifying that computer program itself is not process claim).
115. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1996
WL 257918, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1996) (construing "programmed" as meaning
"programmed with algorithms which process the lip position date and control
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be projected in order to realize its functionality.1 16 However, be-
cause the '532 patent is in the form of celluloid, it is more likely to
fall into the category of non-descriptive material. Although there is
the possibility of arguing that film is analogous to a computer pro-
gram, either way it is unpatentable. Non-functionally descriptive
material when applied to a computer occurs
[w]here certain types of descriptive material, such as ...
photographs... are merely stored so as to be read or out-
putted by a computer without creating any functional in-
terrelationship . . . . The policy that precludes the
patenting of non-functional descriptive material would be
easily frustrated if the same descriptive material could be
patented when claimed as an article of manufacture. For
example, music is commonly sold to consumers in the for-
mat of a compact disc. In such cases, the known compact
disc acts as nothing more than a carrier for non-functional
descriptive material."17
Because a cinematic work is essentially a series of still photographs,
which are merely stored to be outputted on a computer, a cine-
matic work would be non-functionally descriptive. And, because
celluloid stores the movie like a compact disc stores music, the re-
sulting celluloid would be unpatentable as non-functionally descrip-
tive material. Judge Patel reached the same conclusion. 118
However there have been some changes in the law subsequent
to the Guidelines, which change the analysis slightly. First, In Re
Warmerdam, upon which the Guidelines and Judge Patel's judgment
are based, held that the mathematical algorithm test was wrong and
that the correct approach was to follow Diehr, which held that be-
cause the use of a computer achieved a result unknown in the art,
the invention was not unpatentable simply because a computer was
involved. 1 9 It could be argued that, because the inventions let
point date, resulting in date representing the new pixel configuration of the al-
tered first facial display").
116. See Bloomstein, 1996 WL 257918, at *9 (showing that Claim 1 of '532 pat-
ent is "cinematic work").
117. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7481 (emphasizing that process described
does not impart functionality to disk or computer).
118. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures, Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *24-25 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998) (concluding that fin-
ished product was no different from any other cinematic work because it was not
"structurally and functionally interrelated to the medium").
119. See generally In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1994). For a dis-
cussion of this case, see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
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filmmakers do something that was not available in the prior art, the
use of celluloid does not render this invention unpatentable. Fur-
ther, In re Beauregard,12 0 which was decided after the Guidelines, held
that a program stored on a tangible medium was patentable, which
arguably could include a digitally altered cinematic work stored on
celluloid. The decision in State Street 21 is also relevant here because
the emphasis placed on the usefulness of the product led to a con-
clusion that the invention was statutory "even though it was ex-
pressed in numbers."1 22 In the case of the '532 patent, there was a
use for this patent in that Paramount Pictures Corp. infringed upon
it and then argued it was not statutory, just as State Street Bank
infringed upon the Signature Financial Group Inc.'s patent and
then argued it was non-statutory.1 23 Had this case come before the
judge from State Street, it is likely the court would have held that the
'532 patent was statutory even thought it was expressed in film.
Paramount also asserted that the printed matter doctrine ren-
dered the '532 patent invalid under § 101.124 However, what Para-
mount's counsel, Judge Patel and the Federal Circuit failed to
realize was that printed matter, as Paramount argued it, is not a test
for patentable subject matter under § 101. Rather it is an analysis
to be employed in determining whether the subject matter would
have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art under the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.125 In doing so they, as Justice
Stewart held, struck a damaging blow to the basic principles of pat-
ent law by importing into the inquiry under § 101 the criteria of
120. 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that printed matter doctrine no
longer applies to computer program embodied in tangible medium). For further
discussion of this case, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
121. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
1998). For a discussion of this case, see supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
122. See State St., 149 F.3d at 1375 (promoting focusing on essential character-
istics of patent's subject matter).
123. See Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *3 (relating that defend-
ants claimed '532 patent covered unpatentable subject matter); see also State St., 149
F.3d at 1370 (noting that plaintiffs claimed patent was invalid after failed negotia-
tions for license).
124. See Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *25 (explaining that
printed matter is only patentable if claim "involves a new and useful feature of a
physical structure or a new and useful relation between the printed matter and the
physical structure").
125. See generally Ex Parte Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. 465 (B.P.A. 1985) (Nusbaum,
Examiner-in-Chief, concurring) (contrasting point of novelty and viewing claim as
whole approaches).
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novelty and inventiveness, whereas § 101 is concerned only with
subject-matter. 126
The leading historical case on printed matter is In re Sterling, 27
which involved a system of checks and stubs that contained a space
for the amount the depositor wants transferred from a checking
account into a savings account. 128 The system used checkbooks to
insert a savings check's unique stub after a series of regular
checks. 129 Judge Garret noted that the device "presents an inge-
nious and convenient arrangement for those desiring to do busi-
ness in the manner which it suggests."130 Nonetheless, the patent
was rejected because of the printed matter doctrine, which states
that the "mere arrangement of printed matter on [a sheet] of paper
does not constitute patentable subject-matter .... [N]ovelty can-
not be predicated upon printing alone, but must reside in physical
structure."1 3 1 In the case Ex Parte 8,132 a decision that relied on
Sterling, it was held that differences in sound records embodied in a
conventional carrier such as a record cannot be the basis for differ-
ent patents. 133 Clearly following both of these cases, the '532 pat-
ent would not be patentable because it merely amounts to
differences embodied in the conventional carrier, celluloid. How-
ever, these decisions were based on case law predating the 1952
Patent Act, which repealed the section upon which the printed mat-
ter doctrine was based.1 34 Further, the decision in Sterling is out of
step with modern law because, had the invention been invented to-
day, it would still be "an ingenious and convenient way to do busi-
ness," which would have value and would therefore be similar to the
126. See Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *29 ("The '532 patent is
... directed to . . . the images and accompanying soundtrack itself, therefore
questions of novelty and utility are not at issue.").
127. 70 F.2d 910 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (holding that patent must be based on nov-
elty in physical structure).
128. See id. at 911-12 (describing proposed patent and prior patents).
129. See id. (stating that no physical difference existed between stubs, merely
printed matter differed).
130. Id. at 911 (describing manner of business consisting of writing checks
and transferring funds to savings).
131. Id. at 912 (stating that regular checks are not patentable, plaintiff had
previously patented stub, and combination of checks in arrangement was patented
by Watrous, meaning only new feature was writing).
132. 35J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 904 (B.P.A. 1943).
133. See id. at 905.
134. See, e.g., In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that court
must inquire as to whether there is new and unobvious functional relationship
between printed matter and rest of invention). Any rejection based on printed
matter doctrine is based on caselaw before 1952 Patent Act. See id. at 1385 n.8.
The current approach requires that the claim be viewed as a whole. See id.
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invention in State Street. The only differences are that in 1934 it had
to be done using the printed page, whereas today it would be done
using a mathematical algorithm, and it would be patentable under
§ 101 without the printed matter doctrine ever being raised.1 35
Both Bloomstein decisions stated that the printed matter doc-
trine has been refined by In re Gulack,136 but the courts erred here
because Gulack did not refine the doctrine - it replaced it.13 7 Gu-
lack involved a complex system that would "exploit certain arithme-
tic properties of all prime numbers larger than 5, P, to create the
semblance of magic or to educate with respect to intriguing aspects
of number theory."138 The Bloomstein courts erred by failing to take
into account that Gulack was not a case where the patent applica-
tion was denied under § 101, but rather it was denied under
§ 103.139 The rationale of Gulack was that "a printed matter rejec-
tion under section 103 stands on questionable legal and logical
footing."' 40 The key issue was not whether the differences or non-
obviousness lie within the printed matter; it was whether the
printed matter was functionally related to the substrate, which
would occur for example where a computer program reconfigures
the computer. 14 ' Judge Patel recognized the second part but not
the first. She stated twice in the case that § 103 was not at issue. If
§ 103 is not at issue, then the functionally related test from Gulack is
not applicable, because the entire Gulack decision only involved
§ 103. Bloomstein's lawyers attempted to bring this to Judge Patel's
attention by citing Ex Parte Carver,1 4 2 which followed the proper
135. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1984) (allowing patents for discovery or invention of
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter or improve-
ment); see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1984) (outlining reasons to deny patent, none of
which was printed matter doctrine); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1984) (mandating denial of
patent if subject matter would be obvious to person having ordinary skill in art).
See generally, S. REP. No. 82-1979 (1952) (discussing history of patent law and
changes in §§ 101-03).
136. 703 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
137. See id. at 1385 ("Differences between an invention and the prior art cited
against it cannot be ignored merely because those differences reside in the content
of the printed matter.").
138. Id. at 1382 (stating that band has numerous digits imprinted on it, al-
gorithm is used to generate quotient, and mathematical formula will produce an-
swers on band, varying by where starting position on band is located) (footnote
omitted).
139. See id. at 1384 (stating that because claims met requirements of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101, court would address rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103).
140. Id. at 1385 n.8.
141. See In re Gulack, 703 F.2d at 1385-386 (explaining importance of func-
tional, instead of structural relationship).
142. 227 U.S.P.Q. 465 (B.P.A. 1985).
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analysis, but again she missed the distinction between § 101 and
§ 103.143 Following the Gulack approach properly,
[I] t is essential that [the courts] focus on Diamond v. Diehr
.... In our view, the claim analysis principles set forth in
Diehr are fundamentally sound and are equally pertinent
to claims raising non-statutory subject matter issues relat-
ing to . . .mathematical algorithms as well as to printed
matter. 144
Under § 101, Carver upheld an audio recording on the grounds
that, "the claimed recording 'provide [d] the disclosed acoustic phe-
nomena' regardless of what piece of music [was] being played and
thus did not involve the printed matter doctrine."'1 45 There were
three concurring opinions in Carver, and Judge Patel stated that
one of them found a functional relationship and another disagreed
entirely. 146 She mentioned that the three judgments are concur-
ring, yet she somehow missed that concurring means they all agreed
on § 101; the three concurrences disagreed about § 103.147 Exam-
iner-in-Chief Lindquist commented in obiter dictum that the claim
would not hold up under § 103.148
There are similarities in the wording of Examiner-in-Chief
Lindquist's and Judge Patel's judgments. Judge Patel dismissed the
'532 patent by stating, "Here there is no novel and nonobvious [sic]
functional relationship between the 'cinematic work' and any me-
dium on which it would be stored. (No such medium is claimed in
the patent). '"149 Examiner-in-Chief Lindquist, while agreeing that
subject matter was statutory under § 101, said he would dismiss the
patent under § 103 because he found "no new and non-obvious
functional relationship between the substrate and the recorded
sound pattern .... First, the claims at bar [did] not specify the
nature of the substrate .... And second, the substrate serve [d] no
other purpose than a carrier or support for the recorded sound
143. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998
U.S. Dist LEXIS 20839, at *28 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998) (examining whether
printed matter doctrine applies to recordings).
144. Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 467 (adopting claim as whole approach).
145. Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *28 (citing concurring opin-
ion in Carver).
146. Id. (examining whether printed matter doctrine applies to recordings).
147. Id. (discussing concurring opinions).
148. See Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 468 (noting that claims at bar would be "obvi-
ous" under § 103).
149. Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *27.
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pattern."150 But in the concurring opinion that found a functional
relationship, Examiner-in-Chief Nusbaum pointed out that "in view
of our colleague [Lindquist's] comments, we find it appropriate to
balance the record by indicating why, in our opinion, his view is not
legally sound.' 1 5 1 The reason Nusbaum felt obliged to balance the
record was because it was inappropriate for Lindquist to speak in
obiter dictum about § 103 because, as Justice Stewart stated, it struck
a damaging blow to patent law to import a § 103 analysis into § 101.
Because Judge Patel twice recognized that § 103 was not in issue, it
was wrong for her to conclude this matter based on Lindquist's con-
clusions or on Gulack.152 Further, in a footnote, Judge Patel cited
one other case, In re Leitzell,153 regarding patents and cinematic
works, but she stated that the case was decided under § 102 and
therefore not at issue. 154
In re Leitzell is worth considering. The claim failed because an
earlier claim had been granted for film, and the addition of a televi-
sion system component did not distinguish it from the prior art.' 55
This is the same basis on which the invention in Sterling was re-
jected. If Leitzell is inapplicable then so is Sterling, because it was
decided based on the section that today is § 102. The other impor-
tant feature of Leitzell is that it provides another example of a useful
invention, whose process is still used today, where a patent in the
resulting film would be justified.156 The Leitzell invention would be
functionally related to the substrate because it prevents the televi-
sion set or film projector from showing the product without
permission.
Although § 103 was not at issue in Bloomstein, it still is an issue
that the Patent Office must consider when following the Guidelines.
A claim will be denied under § 103
if the prior art suggests storing a song on a disk, merely
choosing a particular song to store on the disk would be
presumed to be well within the level of ordinary skill in
150. See Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 468 (Lindquist, Examiner-in-Chief,
concurring).
151. Id. at 469 (Messenheimer and Nusbaum, Examiner-in-Chief, concurring)
(addressing issue of § 103 although not relevant to case).
152. Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *26 n.8 (noting that printed
matter rejection under § 103 is irrelevant); see id. at *30 n.12 (noting issues not
relevant to court's determination).
153. 213 F.2d 326 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
154. See Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *19.
155. Id. (involving intervention where images were recorded in successive
frames in altered form resulting in unintelligible pictures).
156. Id.
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the art at the time the invention was made. The differ-
ence between the prior art and the claimed invention is
simply a rearrangement of non-functional descriptive
material. 1 57
However, there still might be a legitimate argument that this is an
open question. Carver was a two-to-one decision - though again
both were in obiter dictum - that the resulting recording in a system
of improving the sound in a sound recording was patentable under
§ 103. And as to the functionally related test, the most important
thing about Beauregard is that the Commissioner of Patents rejected
the printed matter approach entirely. The Patent Office in theory
should have gone through a § 103 analysis when considering the
'532 patent, yet it granted the patent.
Bloomstein was appealed to the Federal Circuit, and in a terse
judgment, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court on the de-
cision regarding the printed matter doctrine. 158 It is unfortunate
that, considering the issue of patentability had never before been
decided, that the Federal Circuit, which is known as "[T]he Su-
preme Court of Patents," 159 could not have rendered a more com-
plete judgment or made comment on the district court's better
reasoned Guidelines analysis. 160 But because the Federal Circuit is
the higher authority, the printed matter doctrine becomes the rele-
vant test for determining the patentability of cinematic works. 16'
III. SHOULD PATENT PROTECTION BE GRANTED TO
CINEMATIC WORKS?
The district court in holding the '532 patent invalid remarked
on its understanding of the public policy issue involved:
[I]f Bloomstein's patent were to be declared valid then
any technological device used to enhance visual images on
film (e.g. colorization process or computerized photo-
graphic equipment used to alter contrast or remove ob-
jects from photographic frames [also the invention in
157. Guidelines, 61 Fed. Reg. at 7487.
158. Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 215 F.3d 1351 (relating unpub-
lished opinion).
159. Havluciyan, supra note 6, at 114 (discussing how court had inconsisten-
cies with its treatment of patents for past thirty years).
160. See id. (suggesting that patents will be effective and important form of
intellectual property protection for computer software).
161. See id. at 115 (noting that PTO Guidelines mandate software patents classi-
fied into three categories of patentable subject matter).
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Leitzell would fit in here]) could claim patent rights in the
resulting work, rather than be limited to a patent on the
method used. 162
The question that comes to mind is: What is inherently wrong with
granting a patent in the resulting work of these methods? Each one
of these possesses a useful end result. It is this author's opinion
that the refusal to grant patents in the resulting work is based on
misunderstandings and is inappropriate in light of recent develop-
ments in patent law. 163
A. The History of Patenting Film - Misunderstandings
The patenting of film is one of the most widely misunderstood
areas in patent law. 164 Partly because of these misunderstandings,
an inventor with a special effects claim in cinematic work faces an
uphill battle. 165 This is evident in the arguments made by the de-
fendants in Bloomstein, as well in as the decision of the Federal Cir-
cuit. 166 The courts have stated instinctively that a patent may not be
granted in a cinematic work, but as Judge Patel pointed out, the
defendants were unable to find any case that supported this.167
An illustrative example of the misunderstanding is found in an
article by David Vaver. In arguing that patent protection is too
broad, Vaver states,
The strongest economic argument [for granting patents]
is utilitarian: without [patents], much research and crea-
tivity would not be carried on or financed by firms. But
this is only partly true. No doubt, less activity would occur
- but how much less and in what areas?... Recall that the
motion picture industry, which now relies mainly on copy-
rights, contracts and (increasingly) trademarks to protect
the exploitation of its products, in the beginning pro-
162. Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1998).
163. See Bloomstein, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20839, at *30 (holding that claims of
'532 patent "describe non-functional descript material and therefore are unpatent-
able subject matter under section 101.")
164. See id. at *20 (noting that courts have struggled to define what is ex-
cluded under § 101 and in applying those definitions).
165. See id. (stating that '532 patent serves functional purpose by solving tech-
nological problems using computer based software).
166. Id.
167. See id. (stating that while defendants argue that case law holds cinematic
work is "unpatentable," they cite no cases that expressly discuss patentability of
films or frames of films).
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tected itself with patent pools over the equipment, without
which the patentees argued 'no business could be
conducted.' 1 68
This statement suggests that the motion picture industry is a shin-
ing example of patent holders who falsely claimed they could not
survive without patent protection. Yet, their industry is even more
successful today. Vaver, however, failed to consider what actually
happened in the early days of the movie business. If he had, he
would have realized that the motion picture industry is actually a
shining example of the dangers that threaten an inventor who is
unable to obtain patent protection in the resulting work.
The first film related patent was for Thomas Edison's motion
picture camera. In 1909, Edison joined nine film manufacturers to
form the Motion Picture Trust Company, commonly referred to as
the "Trust. ' 169 Together they held patents for all the motion pic-
ture camera or projection patents. 170 Soon thereafter, the Trust
joined forces with Eastman Kodak, the only source of film stock. In
this way, the Trust had a patent monopoly in the three essential
elements necessary to make films: cameras, film and projectors.1 71
Therefore, the only way to make a film and not violate patent law
was through the Trust.172 The prospect of vast returns of money
that the film industry provided was too much of a temptation.1 73
Independent producers made their own productions in violation of
the Trust's patents in places such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Cuba
and especially Los Angeles.' 74 Because they were working with
bootlegged cameras, they easily would be able to escape across the
Mexican border if the Trust came looking.175 The Trust, in re-
sponse, formed the General Film Company, and "lawsuits were
168. David Vaver, Intellectual Property Today: Of Myths and Paradoxes, 69 CAN.
BAR. REV. 98, 100-01 (1990).
169. See Howard M. Frumes, Surviving the Titanic: Independent Production in an
Increasingly Centralized Film Industry, 19 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 523, 527 (1999) (noting
that production consisted of nine film "manufacturers" led by Edison).
170. See id. (licensing each other's right to utilize such controlled items and
refusing to provide licenses to others).
171. See id.
172. See id. (licensing each other's right to utilize controlled items).
173. See id. (noting that with Trust, no major studios or facilities were needed
to make films).
174. SeeJon Garon, Star Wars: Film Permitting Prior Restraint & Government's Role
in the Entertainment Industry, 17 Loy. L.A. Errr. L.J. 1, 20 (1996) (explaining that
independent film companies fled New York to survive).
175. See id. (noting that Hollywood provided ideal location to work because of
its sunny weather, closeness to mountains and sea; as well as close proximity to
Mexico).
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filed[, c]ameras were confiscated [and p]roductions were shut
down.1 76 The result of the lawsuits did not bode well for the Trust.
Three court decisions brought an end to the Trust's monopoly. 77
The third of those decisions is often cited for the proposition that
film per se is not patentable.
The "patents war" ended with the Supreme Court decision
in Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing
Co., which prohibited the Motion Picture Patents Com-
pany from extending the patent on the projectors to the
films.178
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 179
could be argued to hold that a patent in the underlying film is non-
statutory. To give it that meaning, however, takes the holding out
of context. This action was brought by Edison's Motion Picture Pat-
ents Company ("MPPC") because the General Film Company had
been broken up in 1915 as a monopoly in violation of the Sherman
Act.' 80 MPPC had to resort to clauses in its licensing agreement,
which said that the licensee of the projector could only use films
owned by MPPC. Judge Clarke held that the Patent Act did not
permit the extension of patent monopolies through licensing
agreements. The significance of the case is that Clarke held that a
176. See Frumes, supra note 169, at 528.
177. See generally Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243
U.S. 502 (1917); United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800 (E.D. Pa.
1915); United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 F. 62 (N.D.N.Y. 1915). The court
in Universal held,
IC]ontracts enumerated in the petition, and the combination these de-
scribed, were a conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several states and with foreign nations, and were and are illegal, and that
the defendants and each of them (with the exception next noted) have
attempted to monopolize, and have monopolized, and have combined
and conspired, among themselves and with each other, to monopolize, a
part of trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign na-
tions, consisting of the trade in films cameras, projecting machines, and
other accessories of the motion picture business, as charged in the peti-
tion of complaint tiled.
Universal, 243 U.S. at 811.
178. See Eastman Kodak, 226 F. at 78-79.
179. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Two restrictions discussed in the case were whether
the machine should be used only with motion pictures leased from manufacturer
licensed by plaintiff and whether the machine could be used at all without comply-
ing with plaintiffs fixed terms.
180. See Universal, 243 U.S. at 509 (raising issue as to what extent patentee or
his assignee is authorized by United States patent laws to proscribe by notice at-
tached to patented machine conditions of its use and supplies, which must be used
in operation of it, under pain of infringement of patent).
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patent in a film projector or camera did not extend to the film itself
because it was not included in the patent claim.
The patent law simply protects [the inventor] in the mo-
nopoly of which he has invented and described in the
claims of his patent .... Film is obviously not any part of
the invention of the patent in suit ... because to enforce it
would be to create a monopoly in the manufacture and
use of moving picture films, wholly outside the patent in
suit and of the patent law as we have interpreted it.181
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, in dissent, found that there was
nothing in patent law that would have prevented the MPPC from
extending the patent into the film itself in the way that they did. 18 2
Therefore, the district court in Bloomstein was correct in not
mentioning Universal because, although it refused a patent in film,
it did so on the grounds that it was not included in the patent appli-
cation. Therefore, although Universal is sometimes cited as author-
ity for cinematic works being unpatentable, the case actually leaves
open the question.18 3 Universal must also be looked at in the con-
text of its time. In the early part of the twentieth century, Ameri-
cans were very concerned with anti-trust law, and they feared
monopolies.1 8 4 Holmes' dissent is legally sound, and were this issue
decided for the first time today, it is likely that his reasoning would
be adopted over the majority's, because anti-trust law is not as great
a concern today. It can be argued that Holmes indirectly permitted
patents in film, but even if he did not, and even if patents could not
be granted in the film, the method adopted by MPPC of forcing the
licensee by contract to allow a patent could be adopted by inventors
today.
It is also important to look at the effects of the inability of the
Trust to obtain a patent in the underlying film.
Although Edison's control of the fledgling motion picture
industry was over and the product of the patented projec-
tors could no longer be used to control the market, the
181. Id. at 510, 518.
182. See id. at 519-21 (finding no predominant public interest in order to pre-
vent film feeder from being kept from public).
183. Id.
184. See R.C.C. Cuming & Tamara Buckwold, Interjurisdictional Sales and Fi-
nancing Law, Class Materials (University of Saskatchewan 2000) at 198-99; see also
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 319 (1980) ("The patent laws attempt to
reconcile this Nation's deep seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to en-
courage progress") (Brennan, J.).
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independent companies that fled to survive had perma-
nently taken root in California. They never looked back
and New York [and the Trust] never regained its former
crown as the entertainment capital of the United States. 18 5
And who were those independents? "The companies [which fled to
escape the Trust] included Adolph Zukor (Famous Players/Para-
mount), Carl Laemmle (Universal), and William Fox (Twentieth
Century Fox). "186 So Vaver's statement that the motion picture in-
dustry is still thriving despite the loss of patent protection is partly
true. Paramount, Universal and Twentieth Century Fox are still
thriving today, but only because the patent protection was lost.
These are the entities that infringe. The companies involved in the
Trust ceased to exist shortly after the two Supreme Court deci-
sions.187 Only Kodak exists today.188 It can readily be seen that
Vaver's use of the film industry as an example of why patent protec-
tion is not needed to protect inventors is inappropriate. If any-
thing, the film industry shows just why patents are essential. 189 It
also illustrates how patents in the film itself are also necessary. Cop-
yright was insufficient to protect the General Film Company. They
would have a copyright in the films that they produced themselves,
but not in those made by Paramount, Universal and Twentieth Cen-
tury Fox.190 A patent in the film itself that results in using the pat-
ented inventions would have protected the Trust.191 The Trust had
the strongest patent protection possible.192 It had an exclusive mo-
nopoly on the film, the camera and the projectors. Still the infring-
ers went to Hollywood where they could have easily escaped patent
185. See Garon, supra note 174, at 20-21 (noting that in United States v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp., court again found that practice of licensing and distribution
used by major studios created an illegal monopoly under Sherman Anti-Trust Act).
186. See Frumes, supra note 169, at 529 (noting that as Hollywood film indus-
try structured independent production, production was occurring outside
studios).
187. See id. at 525 (citing United States v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 334 U.S.
131 (1998)). Changes continued as individual actors and directors loosened the
grip of exclusive service agreements and began. to work n pictre-b-pirtilr- hnis.
Id.
188. See id. at 528 (noting Trust's members entered into agreement with only
Kodak).
189. See Vaver, supra note 168, at 120 (noting historical use of patents).
190. See Frumes, supra note 169, at 529 (noting that Fox, Universal and Para-
mount are independent filmmakers).
191. See id. at 528 (noting that agreement with Kodak created monopoly in
cameras, film and projectors which are all essential for film making).
192. For a further discussion of the Trust, see supra notes 169-78 and accom-
panying text.
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protection and brought the Trust to its knees. 193 Had the Trust
had a patent in the resulting film, it would have been saved because
it could have either confiscated the infringing film or obtained
some sort of royalty or damages.
This danger exists today regarding special effects. Canadian
courts are just starting to recognize patentability of computer
processes. Perhaps a patent similar to the '281 patent would come
up before a Canadian court and be rejected based on Schlumberger
or Re Application No. 096,284.'9 Unscrupulous filmmakers could go
to Canada (where film production is increasing), infringe the pat-
ent and then bring the film to the United States. If the U.S. patent
extended to the resulting film, the unscrupulous filmmakers would
be unable to do this. 195
B. The Patent Act is Outdated
The United States Patent Act ("Patent Act") was drafted by
Thomas Jefferson, passed on February 21, 1793, and has not
changed substantially since. 196 Commentators have noted that the
drafters of the Patent Act would not even have been able to con-
ceive of such things as computer technology and modern advances
in the biotech industry when they drafted the Act.
Before the industrial revolution restructured labour [sic]
on divided lines, there was no clear-cut distinction be-
tween discovery and invention, basic and applied research,
and science and technology. Although we are now discov-
ering the artificiality of these divisions, the patent system
continues to reinforce them.1 97
When the Patent Act was drafted, the state of the art was in ma-
chines such as the spinning jenny or the steam engine. Therefore,
at the time, it made sense that there had to be a machine involved.
It also made sense that a patent could not be granted in a mathe-
193. See Frumes, supra note 169, at 529 (noting that as Hollywood film indus-
try became structured into studios, "independent" production could be identified
as production occurring outside studios).
194. For a further discussion of Re Application No. 096,284, see supra notes 89-
91 and accompanying text. For a further discussion of Schlumberger, see supra notes
97-103 and accompanying text.
195. For a further discussion of Canadian patents, see supra notes 87-106 and
accompanying text.
196. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (noting that in 1952 "when pat-
ent laws were recodified, Congress replaced the word "art" with "process," but oth-
erwise left the laws unchanged).
197. Vaver, supra note 168, at 104.
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matical algorithm or in an invention where the only difference be-
tween it and the prior art was in the printed matter. In today's
world these distinctions are no longer valid because computers are
as important to our society as machines were to 1793 society. As we
have learned, the main reason computer patents were denied was
because the Patent Office felt incapable of dealing with all the ap-
plications. Recognizing the importance of computers to society,
the courts have decided to grant the applications and ignore the
old rule about mathematical algorithms. It follows from this that it
is ridiculous to continue analogizing high-tech computer-related in-
ventions to printed matter.198 This is why Gulack held that a
printed matter rejection stands on questionable legal footing. 199
And this is why Carver suggested a return to Diehr rather than utilize
a printed matter, even the so-called modified one that the Bloom-
stein courts used, or mathematical algorithm analysis. 200
The better approach is to recognize that the Patent Act as
drafted in 1793 incorporated broad language so that advances that
could not be contemplated at the time would be patentable when
they arose in the future.201 As Congress stated when it created
§ 101, statutory subject matter includes "anything under the sun
that is made by man."20 2 But the Federal Circuit has held "despite
the oft-quoted statement... Congress did not so mandate. '20 3 This
holding, however, is not consistent with the principal draftsperson's
statement, that under § "101 [] a person may have invented a ma-
chine or a manufacture which may include anything under the sun
that is made by man. '20 4 As Chief Justice Burger held,
The subject-matter provisions of the patent law have been
cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statu-
tory goal of promoting "the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts" with all that means for the social and eco-
198. For a further discussion of In Re Gulack, see supra notes 136-41 and ac-
companying text.
199. CompareEx Parte Carver, 227 U.S.P.Q. 465 (1985), with Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
200. For a discussion of court's reasoning in Carver, see supra note 145 and
accompanying text.
201. See In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (noting that
Congress included as patentable subject matter "any process, machine, manufac-
turer, or composition of matter, any improvement thereof . ").
202. S. REP. No. 82-1979, at 5 (1952).
203. See Warmerdam, 33 F.3d at 1358 (citing 1952 Patent Act's legislative
history).
204. Hearings on H.t 3760 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 82d Cong. 37 (1951).
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nomic benefits envisioned by Jefferson. Broad general
language is not necessarily ambiguous when congressional
objectives require broad terms .... Mr. Justice Douglas
reminded that the inventions most benefiting mankind
are those that "push back the frontiers of chemistry, phys-
ics, and the like" . . . . Congress employed broad general
language in drafting § 101 precisely because such inven-
tions are often unforeseeable. 20 5
It would have been unforeseeable in the early days of film that tech-
niques such as colorization, scrambling and the Bloomstein process
would have been available. 20 6 The significance of the broad lan-
guage is that as long as the invention is a manufacture and is not a
law of nature, abstract idea, or natural phenomena, it is
patentable. 207
C. Liberalizing of Patent Protection in Analogous Areas
To determine whether a patent in the resulting film is a manu-
facture and is not merely an abstract idea, it helps to look away
from the printed matter analysis to other areas of patent law. Four
examples of patents that have been allowed illustrate that the '532
patent falls within the broad language of statutory subject matter
and within the language of § 103.20
1. The Polyploid Oyster
Ex Parte Allen 2°9 involved a method for producing polyploid
oysters by isolating male oysters from female oysters and then in-
ducing the oysters to spawn. 210 The inventor had claimed a patent
both in the process and in the resulting polyploid oyster. Exam-
iner-in-Chief Smith for the Board of Patent Appeals held that this
was a valid patent, stating,
205. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980) (discussing petitioners' second
argument that microorganisms cannot be patentable until Congress expressly au-
thorizes such protection).
206. For a discussion of Bloomstein's patents, see supra note 6 and accompa-
nying text.
207. See Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945) (discussing Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1984) and distinguishing Parker and finding that statute was
not confined to "particular application[s] . . . contemplated by the legislators").
208. For a further discussion of these four examples, see infra notes 209-39
and accompanying text.
209. 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (1987).
210. See id. at 1426.
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The examiner has presented no evidence that the claimed
polyploid oysters occur naturally without the intervention
of man, nor has the examiner urged that polyploid oysters
occur naturally. The record before us leads to no conclu-
sion other than that the claimed polyploid oysters are non-
naturally occurring manufactures or compositions of mat-
ter within the confines of patentable subject matter under
35 U.S.C. 101.211
In Bloomstein, Judge Patel stated that to grant a patent in the end
result of the '532 patent would be wrong, because the process was
already protected in the '281 patent.21 2 Why then is it allowable for
a patent to be granted in the polyploid oyster as well as the process
that produces it? This is a case where the printed matter doctrine
as used in Bloomstein could have applied because the invention is
the polyploidy, the common carrier is the oyster itself. The court
gets around this issue by focusing on the fact that the oyster did not
occur naturally. The resulting celluloid of the Bloomstein patent, a
colorized film, or a scrambled film do not occur naturally either;
they appear in that state because of the intervention of human
ingenuity.
2. Azadirachtin Solution and The Neem Tree
W.R. Grace & Co. obtained a patent for both a method of cre-
ating a stabilized azadirachtin solution and the stabilized azadirach-
tin solution itself called Neemix.2 1 3 The resulting solution makes
the extract more valuable to the pesticide industry and more useful
to farmers.21 4 The Neemix solution patent has attracted a great
deal of controversy. The azadirachtin solution had been the subject
211. Id. at 1427. By controlling the temperature of the oyster's eggs, fertiliz-
ing the eggs to form zygotes, and applying hydrostatic pressure to the zygotes at a
predetermined intensity for a predetermined time following the formation of the
.y -I induced resulting in an oyster that is not found in nature. See
id.
212. See Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839, at *30 (Mar. 10, 1998) (holding that claim of '532 patent
described non-functional descriptive material and therefore was unpatentable
under § 101).
213. See Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict Over the Corn-
modification of Life, 22 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 279, 283-84 (1999) (noting that
group of American researchers found way to create storage-stable).
214. See id. at 283 (noting that neem tree, azadirachta indica, is known to cure
ailments).
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of Indian traditional medicine for years. 215 However the Patent Of-
fice found no problem in granting the patent application.
According to U.S. law, purification or modification of a
naturally occurring compound can result in the award of a
patent with claims to the purified substance. Further, the
Grace patent appears to satisfy 35 U.S.C. sections 101, 102,
and 103 . . . . The fact that some contend that the im-
provement was "obvious" in India to Indian farmers does
not itself defeat patentability in the United States ... for-
eign knowledge can only defeat a U.S. patent's novelty
claim if that foreign knowledge appeared in a printed
publication before the invention or application by the
U.S. applicant.21 6
The '532 patent failed in the district court and Federal Circuit be-
cause it was considered non-obvious. How then is it justified that a
patent on the improvement contained in the Neemix solution is
non-obvious? Is it functionally related to the substrate? Consider
this statement:
For many, the neem tree controversy is more specifically
about the inequitable distribution of Grace's economic
gain. For many activists, it is inconceivable that those who
merely "tinkered" with neem seeds should retain all eco-
nomic benefit. They maintain that Indians provided the
raw material - an assiduously cultivated understanding of
the neem tree's properties - and that therefore they are
the rightful beneficiaries of any commercial
development. 21 7
What is the practical difference between what W.R. Grace did and
what the '532 patent did? By examining the effect the '532 patent
had on the film itself, it is apparent that Paramount supplied the
raw material; in this case it would be the film Forrest Gump. The
method of the '532 patent improved the film by making it appear as
if John F. Kennedy were speaking the lines of dialogue that he
"said" to the fictional Forrest Gump. Without the '532 patent, Ken-
nedy would speak the dialogue he spoke in the real life film clip
that was used. If the slight improvement made by W.R. Grace was
215. See id. (noting that solution is also used in Indian cultures to prevent
psoriasis, to clean teeth, as antidote for malaria, as spermicide and as insecticide).
216. See id. at 284 (stating that Environmental Protection Agency registered
Neemix in 1994).
217. See Marden, supra note 213, at 287.
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sufficient to make Neemix novel even though Indian farmers al-
ready possessed this knowledge, then certainly the ingenuity of film-
makers to produce the effect of Kennedy speaking to Forrest Gump
should support the argument that a patent should be granted in
the underlying film. Just as a patent was obtainable in the end
Neemix solution, which is a result of using the patented method, a
patent should be obtainable in the film, which was a result of the
patentable special effect process.
3. Strawberry Flavoring
The court in In re Kratz2 18 allowed a patent for using a certain
constituent of strawberries to enhance strawberry flavor in foods. 219
This was a decision under § 103, which under the Guidelines was a
barrier for obtaining a patent in film. 220 Judge Baldwin of the
C.C.P.A. noted that the strawberry flavor compound 2-methyl-2-
penetenoic acid ("2M2PA") is a naturally occurring product found
in strawberries. 22 1 Judge Baldwin also noted that appellants were
apparently not the first to discover or synthesize 2M2PA in a sub-
stantially pure form.222 The sole distinction between the substan-
tially pure 2M2PA and that known in the art was the use to impart
an enhanced fresh fruit flavor. 223 This sounds similar to printed
matter, and the patent was held to be not obvious because
[a]ppellants do not seek to claim 2M2PA, per se, nor
2M2PA in its natural state, nor even a composition encom-
passing strawberries; but instead present claims to compo-
sitions containing substantially pure 2M2PA and
preparative methods thereof. Since the claims do not en-
compass natural compositions, in that "substantially pure"
2M2PA does not apparently occur in nature ... the test is
not met.
2 2 4
218. 592 F.2d 1169 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
219. See id. at 1173 (stating that appellants were first to patent 2-methyl-2-
penetenoic acid in fresh strawherries).
220. See id. at 1175 (noting that issue in case was whether it would be obvious
to use compounds found in strawberries to create strawberry flavoring or whether
addition of substantially pure synthetically produced 2M2PA to food made it
unobvious).
221. See id. at 1172 (stating that record established that appellants did no
more than expected analysis for expected objective).
222. See In re Kratz, 592 F.2d at 1173 (stating that same action was brought in
Application of Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394 (1970)).
223. See id. (noting that this use was heart of rejection).
224. Id. at 1174.
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To use Baldwin's language from Kratz, the '532 patent "is not seek-
ing to claim a patent in the entire movie Forrest Gump, per se, nor
Forrest Gump in its natural state before the '281 patent process was
used on it, but instead the '532 patent claims to the portions of the
film containing the altered lip movements (via the '532 patent) and
the preparative methods thereof (via the '281 patent)."225 Because
the claim does not encompass the film as it was before, the test
would not be met here either.
4. Diamond v. Chakrabarty
The liberalization of granting patent applications that has oc-
curred over the years, providing the groundwork for the decisions
to grant patents for polyploid oysters and the Neemix solution, is
mainly due to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.226 The analysis employed by Chief Justice
Burger in Chakrabarty leads to the conclusion that film would also
be patentable. Chakrabarty claimed a patent in the process used to
produce certain bacteria. Likewise, the process used to produce
should also be granted patent protection.227 The patent was
granted. The applicant in Chakrabarty also claimed a patent in the
resulting bacteria, but the Patent Office denied this on the grounds
that it was unpatentable under § 101 as a law of nature. Similarly,
the patent in the resulting film was using the special effect provi-
sion denied for being an abstract idea.228 The issue for the Su-
preme Court to decide in Chakrabarty was whether the bacteria
constituted a manufacture or a composition of matter.229
The Court defined manufacture as "the production of articles
for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials
new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-
labor or by machinery."23 0 The '532 patent produces a new article
(in our example it is the film Forrest Gump with President Kennedy
speaking the film's dialogue) from the use of raw materials (which
is the film with President Kennedy speaking the dialogue he origi-
225. See id. (construing Baldwin's statements regarding issue at hand).
226. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Compare Marden, supra note 213, at 279, with Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
227. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 304.
228. See id. at 306 (noting that Chakrabarty appealed to Patent Office Board
of Appeals and Board affirmed).
229. See id. at 307 (explaining that Patent Office Board of Appeals relied on
1930 Plant Patent Act's legislative history and concluded that § 101 was not in-
tended to cover things laboratory created).
230. Id. at 308 (noting definition used came from American Fruit Growers, Inc.
v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1, 11 (1938)).
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nally spoke). The changed film possesses new qualities by the ma-
chinery of the '281 patent. Therefore, it should be considered to
be a manufacture under the Supreme Court's definition.
The Supreme Court defined composition of matter as "all com-
positions of two or more substances and ... all composite articles
whether they be the result of chemical union, or of mechanical
mixture."231 It is more of a stretch to fit film into this definition.
The resulting film would be a composition of the digital animation
of the new lip movements, which according to the patent are con-
tained in one piece of film (substance number 1) with the film with
the old lip positions (substance number 2).232 The result is not the
result of a chemical or mechanical union; it happens inside a com-
puter and therefore would be a digital mixture.23 3 The definition
used in Chakrabarty came from a 1957 decision that cited a textbook
from 1937, both before computer technology was prevalent in soci-
ety. 2 3 4 Had computer technology been as important in 1957 as it is
today, it would be likely that some form of digital mixture would be
included in the definition. ChiefJustice Burger stated, "[I] n choos-
ing such expansive terms as 'manufacture' and 'composition of
matter,' modified by the comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly
contemplated the patent laws be given wide scope." 23 5 Because of
this recognition, a digital mixture should not be a hurdle to
patentability.
Burger also recognized that § 101 does impose some limits. 23 6
For example, a pure discovery of nature or a formula such as
E=MC2 would be unpatentable, but
U]udged in this light, [Chakrabarty's] microorganism
plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is
not to a hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a
nonnaturally [sic] occurring manufacture or composition
of matter - a product of human ingenuity "having a dis-
tinctive name, character [and] use."237
231. Id.; se a ,-" Sh1 fev Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (D.C. 1957).
232. For a further discussion of the '532 patent in Bloomstein, see supra note
116 and accompanying text.
233. Compare Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20839 (Mar. 10, 1998), with Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447
U.S. 303 (1979).
234. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 303 (noting that legislative history supported
expression of composition of matter definition).
235. See id. at 309.
236. See id. (noting that things such as laws of nature, physical phenomena
and abstract ideas are not patentable).
237. Id.
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The reasoning behind the prohibition against patenting a formula
is roughly for the same as the reasoning why printed matter cannot
be patented; the policy behind both is that the discoverer has come
up with nothing new. 238 The '532 patent does allow a new discov-
ery. 23 9 It is, as Burger required, a fundamentally different manufac-
ture or composition of matter, which is a product of Bloomstein's
ingenuity having a distinctive character (Kennedy speaking differ-
ent words than he actually did) and use (by providing the film-
makers with the ability to make more realistic films and the
filmgoers with a more enjoyable movie).
D. The Case Against
Obviously the greatest bar to the patenting of film is that pro-
tection is available through copyright. 240 Copyright protects the
maker's films. 24 1 It is argued that because film is a work of art and
copyright protection is also provided, there is no need to grant pat-
ent protection as well. It would be ridiculous to grant a patent to
the studio that produced Forrest Gump or the filmmakers who made
it because the film is a creative work. The printed matter doctrine
would be correctly applied. 242 However, as Justice Stevens stated,
" [T] he starting point in the proper adjudication of patent litigation
is an understanding of what the inventor claims to have in-
vented."243 With the '532 patent, what was invented was not a crea-
tive work of art - it was a process of enabling the filmmakers to
make the work of art better. Patents such as the '532 patent allow
the filmmakers to make, and the filmgoers who watch to experi-
ence, a mummy walking with realistic human movements, to view a
black and white movie in color, or to make it look as if historical
figures were interacting with a fictional character. The Leitzell pat-
ent allows cable companies such as HBO the ability to prevent those
238. See id. at 310 (citing Harntraft v. Wiegmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615 (1887))
(holding that patentee who discovered species of rootnodule bacteria and who
produced mixed culture from species unpatentable because patentee had discov-
ered "only some handiwork of nature").
239. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 310 (stating that in order to be patentable,
patentee should produce something new with different characteristics from any
found in nature).
240. See generally Vaver, supra note 168, at 98 (suggesting that in copyright and
patent fields, claims rest on myth and paradox rather than proof).
241. See id. at 107 (noting that "artistic works" are covered and these include
drawing, engraving and sculpting).
242. See id. at 106 (stating that copyrights protect movies, television, music
and literature).
243. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 193-94 (1980).
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who have not paid for their service from having access to it.244 Fur-
ther in Leitzell, the patent that these special effects technicians
would be granted are not in the film as a whole but only in the
selected frames in which their ingenuity was utilized. 245 The special
effects provide a practical use by applying science to produce a bet-
ter result. The THX sound system would be able to obtain a patent
in the resulting film under Carver. Therefore, why should not a sci-
entific improvement in the visual medium? As Judge Patel held in
Bloomstein, "Bloomstein may have potential copyright protection for
the resulting cinematic work using his method. This court does not
consider this argument relevant to the question of whether the '532
patent covers valid subject matter."246 The dual coverage of copy-
right and patent was recognized as long ago as 1915. "[T]he
Edison patent on the picture film was limited to its negative form,
and did not cover the positive motion picture films, which were
dealt in commercially." 247 This recognized that the positive motion
picture is the artistic endeavor covered by copyright and that the
negative form was a scientific endeavor produced by the ingenuity
of Thomas Edison. There is no reason why the negative portions of
Forrest Gump or of the colorized or scrambled movie should not be
covered by a patent, leaving the positive work protected by a differ-
ent copyright holder.
IV. CONCLUSION
Special effects are becoming more and more important to the
film industry. A great deal of ingenuity is required to produce
them. With that ingenuity comes the potential for conflicts over
intellectual property rights. As the Bloomstein patent and the ex-
perience of Thomas Edison illustrate, hard work and years of effort
can easily be infringed upon, with inventor reward. Patent protec-
tion is required. Because the majority of special effects work is
done on computers, their patentability depends on the patentabil-
ity of computer software. Because the Patent Office has moved
away from its doolnsday predictions that it would be unable to han-
244. For a further discussion of In re Leitzell, see supra notes 153-56 and ac-
companying text.
245. See In Re Leitzell, 213 F.2d 326, 327 (C.C.P.A. 1954) (explaining that in
order to be of any availability at all, individual frame images disclosed in apparatus
of reference must constitute continuous depiction of photographed subject and
must be recovered in sequence).
246. Bloomstein v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-95-1864 MHP, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2039, at *30 n.12 (Mar. 10, 1998).
247. See United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 225 F. 800, 811 (E.D. Pa.
1915).
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dle the flood of computer applications and because courts have
moved towards allowing patenting for nearly every sort of computer
program, special effects process patents can be protected. But as
the Bloomstein case proves, because the '281 patent was held not to
be infringed, the possibility of infringement is still very real, and
therefore the dangers that occurred at the turn of the twentieth
century, provide a real threat of reoccurring again. Therefore, it is
important for special effects inventors to be able to claim patent
protection in the film itself. It is unjust that patents are available in
oysters, solutions, strawberry flavoring, and bacteria resulting from
processes, but patents in film are not. Once the courts realize this,
it is likely they will agree.
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